Fear and Loathing on Fukushima Unit 4

Fear and Loathing on Fukushima Unit 4

By Hatrick  Penry

9/29/13

hunter thompson

(above: Author Hunter Thompson (1937-2005) was never afraid to report the truth no matter how ugly it was.)

The trick is to convince the American public, and indeed the world, that the worst-of-the-worst has not already happened at Fukushima. Even if that means a media campaign of fear-mongering based around a fantasy doomsday scenario involving the collapse of Unit 4 and its spent fuel pool. Interestingly enough, all the alternative and mainstream media outlets that are promoting this bogus Unit 4 doomsday scenario are the same ones who have chosen not to report on the Nuclear Regulatory Agency’s Freedom of Information Act documents pertaining to Fukushima. These documents tell the true story of Fukushima: the multi-agency cover-up that downplayed and concealed the radioactive plume and fallout, the reality of a prolonged station blackout that produced three ‘China Syndrome’ meltdowns, and the Unit 4 spent fuel pool zirconium fire and subsequent ‘melt on the floor’ of the fuel rods.

The sad reality is that the effects of a nuclear plant meltdown or spent fuel pool fire can be so sudden and so severe that the possibility exists that no safety precautions can be taken quickly enough to avoid the consequences completely. In the case of the Fukushima catastrophe, it took about a week to produce a measurable plume that traveled south down the coast and then swept inland across Tokyo. These plumes were laden with aerosolized plutonium. I ask you: how do you evacuate Tokyo in less than a week?  How will we evacuate New York if Indian Point has an accident and produces a plume? Where do you relocate a city of millions of people?

So you see, the reality of the potential of a meltdown or meltdowns is so horrific, it must be hidden from the public at all costs. And when a meltdown does occur, the truth of its severity and its effects must also be hidden from the public at all costs. Can you imagine what it would have been like if TEPCO, the Government of Japan, the NRC and the White House had been up front and 100% honest about the disaster from the start? What would have happened if officials announced that 1) a plutonium laden plume was drifting towards Tokyo and 2) multiple plumes and fallout were heading across the Pacific towards the West Coast of the US? What would have happened if officials were up front and honest about the triple ‘China Syndrome’ and Unit 4 ‘melt on the floor’ and its effects? No matter how you slice it, it would be ugly, very ugly.

It seems to me that when a country desires both national security and nuclear power at the same time, it desires the impossible. Furthermore, how can one have a rational discussion about national security if one does not include a frank, open discussion about the decommissioning of all nuclear plants? Which is a greater threat to the American public, Iran’s nuclear program or our own nuclear program? Why would Iran build a nuclear bomb to use against the US when we have hundreds of stationary bombs, in the form of reactors and fuel pools, already positioned throughout the country, with incredible payloads far beyond the capacity of any bomb or missile? Think of the possibilities: terrorist attack, sabotage, earthquake, tsunami, earthquake AND tsunami, flooding from a broken dam upriver, or even the old-fashioned accident that aging reactors are bound to have from time to time…why do we leave ourselves so vulnerable?

About the Fukushima Unit 4 Spent Fuel Pool:

The evidence, from the NRC FOIA documents pertaining to Fukushima, has led me to believe that:

1)      The March 11th, 2011 earthquake caused immediate structural damage to the Unit 4 building. Spent fuel pool coolant began to drain out through a crack or cracks that were a result of the earthquake.

2)      There was an H2 explosion and a wall or walls of the SFP #4 were ‘blown out’.

3)      On March 15th 2011, the hot offload of fuel experienced a zirconium cladding fire and subsequent meltdown to the floor of the spent fuel pool. According to the IAEA, SFP #4 was on fire and emitting radiation directly to the atmosphere for at least 9 hours and 10 minutes before TEPCO claimed it was extinguished.

4)      75% or more of the radiation contained in SFP #4 may have been released into the atmosphere. Modeling was done on a 100% release.

5)      Any fuel rods recovered (official numbers vary on what the inventory was) will be ones that were unused and ‘cool’…probably less than 25% of inventory. It is possible that all fuel rods were affected and none will be salvageable.

The Evidence:

To be clear: I cannot prove that the spent fuel pool of Unit 4 has been destroyed or damaged. Nor can the nuclear apologists prove that the pool is full of water and the fuel rods are intact. It should be noted that those who claim that the damage to SFP 4 was minimal and that the rods will be recovered have only their rhetoric to back them up. They offer no proof. YouTube videos alleging to be of the Unit 4 spent fuel pool could be any spent fuel pool in the world. Is it not evidence in and of itself that they have not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that their claims are true? How hard would it be to hold a current newspaper in front of a video camera and then make an inspection of Units 1-4 for the world to see? Do you believe TEPCO? Do you believe the NRC? Do you believe the Government of Japan or our own government? All of these entities have extensive track records of deception and dishonesty and they all have reason to hide the truth, especially in the case of the Fukushima disaster.

(below) The effects of a prolonged station blackout (SBO) caused by a 9.0 earthquake and 46 foot tall tsunami are catastrophic.

57 200 zirc fire 3 n 4

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: normal operating temperature of the coolant in a spent fuel pool is 30 degrees Celsius.

90 sfp 4 30 degress celcius starting temp

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: March 14th, 2011 the temperature of SFP #4 is now at 84 degrees Celsius.

91 sfp 4 temp rising march 14th 84 c

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: March 15th FAX  from the IAEA to the NRC “Release Radioactivity Unit 4 Fukushima Daiichi NPP”

96 unit 4 radiation release

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: March 15th, 2011-Japanese authorities inform the IAEA that the spent fuel pond at Unit 4 is on fire and that “…radioactivity is being released directly into the atmosphere.”

97 IAEA informed by Japanese on SFP unit 4 fire and radiation release 15 march 2011

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: Japanese authorities claim the fire at the spent fuel pool of Unit 4 is extinguished 9 hours and 10 minutes after it begins. Evidence found in the NRC FOIA documents contradicts this claim. As of March 16th, TEPCO had yet to remove the rubble blocking the path of fire trucks and other heavy equipment to the Fukushima facility. Helicopter water drops, the only other method of delivering water to the spent fuel pools, are said to be ineffective by NRC officials.

98 more on unit 4 spent fuel pond release of radiation

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: Situation Report Update shows Unit 4 spent fuel pool in grave danger. Radiation levels are too high to initiate countermeasures at 30 REM/hr. Note that NRC officials were adamant that the ‘lube oil fire’ of Unit 4 was NOT a lube oil fire and instead referred to it as a ‘seminal event’.

99.3 unit 4 fire 4 to 5 hours no fire fighting due to high rads pair with IAEA report

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: As the spent fuel pools heat up, access problems (of which radioactive MOX sludge was a factor) and high radiation levels impede any response to the disaster.

99.6 unit 4 fire 4 to 5 hours no fire fighting fatal doses to workers

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: (part 1 of a 5 part series) Plume modeling (direction of plume by elevation) from the 15th to the 18th of March, 2011 by the Japan Meteorological Agency.  While this modeling may or may not be based on the releases of SFP #4, it is indicative of where the winds of that time period might have carried radiation.

99.9 unit 4 modeling

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: (part 2 of a 5 part series) Plume modeling of Cs-137 by the Japan Meteorological Agency. If modeling of plutonium was done by any agency or country, it has yet to be found in the NRC FOIA documents pertaining to Fukushima.

100 unit 4 modeling

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: (part 3 of a 5 part series) Plume modeling of Cs-137.

101 unit 4 modeling

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: (part 4 of a 5 part series) Plume modeling of Cs-137.

102 unit 4 modeling

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: (part 5 of a 5 part series) Plume modeling of Cs-137.

103 unit 5 modeling

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: confirmation of damage to wall of Fukushima Unit 4.

400 march 15th wall damaged unit 4

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: email from March 15th, 2011 “U4 zirc fire, catastrophe”

410 unit 4 zirc fire catastrophe march 15th

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry (M.E.T.I.) News Release: at 10:30 UTC on March 15th-orders are given to extinguish the fire at Unit 4 and prevent “re-criticality”.

412 METI march 15th news release pt 2 (2)

412.1 METI march 15th news release pt 2 (1)

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: email from March 16th, 2011-”U4 situation deteriorating. SFP water inventory is lost…dose rates around U4 make entry impossible…”

412.3 sfp 4 inventory down to the 50

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: email from March 16th, 2011 “The walls of the Unit 4 spent fuel pool have collapsed, and there is no water in there.”

marcg 16th ADD TO FEAR AND LOATH

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: cover-page for a March 16th transcript wherein the damage to Unit 4 is discussed extensively. Speakers include then NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko, Regional Administrator for Region 3 Chuck Casto and Director of the Office of Public Affairs Eliot Brenner.

412.5 walls blown out

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents:  Chuck Casto: “…we absolutely know that pool no. 4, though, the walls have collapsed…”

412.6 walls blown out

412.7 collapse - Copy

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: Chuck Casto: “You cannot get inventory [coolant] above the bottom of the fuel.”

412.8 walls blown out

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: further discussion of damage to the Unit 4 spent fuel pool.

412.9 walls blown out

413 pg221 blown out - Copy

413.1 pg221 blown out - Copy

413.2 pg221 blown out - Copy

413.2 pg221 blown out

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: Chuck Casto stakes his career on Unit 4 having major damage.

413.3 casto stakes career on unit 4

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: Mike Weber “The pool structure is no longer in existence. The walls have collapsed. So, you have spent fuel sitting there in a pile.”

413.4 pg162 wall collapse unit 4 - Copy

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: a discussion of “quenching” the pool (filling it with water…saltwater at first)

414 quenching sfp 4

414.1 quenching sfp 4

414.2 quenching sfp 4

414.3 quenching sfp 4

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: this next series of screencaptures centers around a discussion about a video that TEPCO alleges shows water in the Unit 4 spent fuel pool. The TEPCO video surfaced after then NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko stood before members of Congress on the 15th of March, 2011 and announced that the spent fuel pool at Unit 4 was dry. Throughout the NRC FOIA documents there is evidence that TEPCO pressured officials at the NRC to ‘reconsider’ their position. A final back-and-forth between Gregory Jaczko, Chuck Casto and Eliot Brenner settles the matter when they decide Jaczko will not ‘roll back’ any of his statements  on Unit 4.

414.4 tepco video\

414.5 the video pg 390

414.6 zirc reaction 390.1 vid

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: the TEPCO video discussion continues…

414.7 unit 4 402 video

414.8 unit 4 403 video

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: more on the TEPCO video…

415.2 tepco vid pg 405

415.3 the video pg 406

415.4 the video pg 407

415.5 the video pg 407.5

415.6 the video pg 408

415.7 the video pg 408.5

415.8 the video pg 409

415.9 the video pg 410

416 the video pg 410.5

416.1 the video pg 411

416.2 the video pg 411.5

416.3 the video pg 412

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: the saga of the TEPCO video continues…

416.4 the video pg 414

416.5 the video pg 415

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: a discussion about the source of information about the Unit 4 spent fuel pool.

416.6 the video pg 418

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: Jaczko will not be “rolling back” any of his statements on Unit 4

416.7 rollback pg 421

416.8 the video pg 422

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: confirmation from a secondary source that the SFP of Unit 4 is dry.

423.5 walls blown out 2nd confirmation

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: March 16th, 2011 inputs for a RASCAL (plume modeling) projection. Considering the assumption that “all of the fuel melted” on Unit 4 it’s no wonder this information was not to be shared outside of the NRC.

424. 5 march 16th rascal projection includes unit 4

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: March 17th, 2011 “…freezing out information from the other Commissioner offices” and ” the ET stuck to the story that U4 SFP is likely dry.”

424.8 unit 4 dry info freeze

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: March 17th, 2011 email-note that the NRC is sticking with the pool as being empty and offer reasons why.

425 unit 4 we are sticking with it as being empty

(below) From the NRC documents: a March 17th “NRC INFORMATION NOTICE” that states “Unit 4 suffered a total loss of water along with an inability to retain water.”

march 17th ADD TO FEAR AND LOATH 2

march 17th ADD TO FEAR AND LOATHING 3

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: Reactor and Water Pool Release Considerations as of March 18th, 2011. Note the peak of an incredible 400 REM/hr at the Fukushima facility and the statement that “periodic additional releases of radioactivity are occurring as the plants vent to atmosphere”.

426.1 reactor and pool release considerations mar 18 2011

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: Reactor and Water Pool Release Considerations as of March 18th, 2011 continued…”NRC believes that water from the unit 4 storage pool completely drained and a violent zirconium and water reaction occurred…”

426.2 reactor and pool release considerations mar 18 2011

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: Reactor and Water Pool Release Considerations as of March 18th, 2011 continued…Bettis Laboratory estimates doses at 50 miles from a spent fuel pool meltdown. Evidence throughout the NRC FOIA documents pertaining to Fukushima indicates that estimates, assumptions and modeling was based on a worst-case-scenario at Unit 4.

426.3 reactor and pool release considerations mar 18 2011

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: Reactor and Water Pool Release Considerations as of March 18th, 2011 continued. Here is why they don’t want you to know what really happened at Fukushima Unit 4…”In the more extreme scenarios involving significant additional core or pool damage, there would not be sufficient time to evacuate Navy civilians,  military personnel, and their dependents to avoid the higher exposure levels discussed above.”

426.4 reactor and pool release considerations mar 18 2011

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: an email from March 18th, 2011…”Proposal to handle dried spent fuel pool.docx”

429 dried sfp 4

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: emails from March 18th, 2011 show concern for the duration that fuel rods have been left to cool in the spent fuel pool. Fuel rods that are a fresh offload are much hotter than fuel rods that have cooled for 2 or more years. Hotter fuel is naturally more dangerous if coolant levels drop or if a spent fuel pool drains out entirely.  

429.5 march 18th ammount of 105 day old fuel in sfp 4

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: evidence of a fresh offload of hot fuel into the Unit 4 spent fuel pool.

429.6 time of offload fuel unit 4

(below) Cover-page for NRC’s “Waste Confidence Generic Environmental Impact Statement” NUREG-2157 for the next screencapture.

429.7 nrc waste confidence report

(below) From NRC’s  “Waste Confidence Generic Environmental Impact Statement” NUREG-2157…’time-to-release’ could be less than 10 hours if fuel has had less than 2 years to cool.

429.8 NRC time to release for hot and cool fuel

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: March 18th brief: Unit 4 “pool may be dry; damage to fuel rods suspected”

430 march 18th sfp 4 must be dry bundles numbers of

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: March 18th, 2011…the source term provided to NARAC (does plume modeling) includes the assumption that  “100% of the total spent fuel was released to the atmosphere from Unit 4.” Note the flawed modeling based on a limited 96 hour release. Measured plume maps found in the NRC FOIA documents prove that emissions were ongoing beyond the month of March, 2011.

434 march 18th 100 percent of sfp 4 released to atmosphere model

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: a March 18th, 2011 email with a reference to then NRC Chairman Jaczko’s testimony that SFP 4 was dry. Jaczko’s information was derived from NRC officials that were ‘embedded’ with TEPCO, Conti and the Government of Japan.

434.1 wash post reference to chairman unit 4 dry

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: a March 18th, 2011 email showing concern for the spacing of hotter fuel rods in the Unit 4 spent fuel pool. If freshly offloaded rods are clumped together, it makes a low or no coolant situation exponentially worse. “Checker-boarding” stores hot fuel rods next to cool fuel rods to even out the heat. 

434.2 question on layout of fuel rods in sfp 4

 (below) From the NRC’s NUREG-2157: hot fuel rods stored in close proximity could allow the “runaway oxidation reaction to spread”. This is known as a “propagating zirconium cladding fire” or a “zirc fire”.

434.3 NRC ML13224A106 proximity of rods make a difference pair up with checkerboard

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: a March 29th, 2011 email showing the ‘perfect storm’ for the Unit 4 spent fuel pool: full core offload about 120 days ago, no checker-boarding of hotter fuel, structural damage, dry pool and “cladding/water” reaction.

434.4 march 29th hardcore unit 3 and 4 evaluation

434.5 march 29th fred brown on units 1-4

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: cover-page for a summary of the Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano’s press briefing of the 19th of March, 2011. Note the colored chart found below indicates that the Unit 4 spent fuel pool is “now in preparation for filling the water”.

435 march 19th unit 3 and unit 4 prepped for filling with water pt 1

aaaaa 435.1 march 19th unit 3 and unit 4 prepped for filling with water pt 2

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: a March 19th email from former American Nuclear Society President William Burchill asking relevant questions…

435.2 march 19th burchill former ANS president questions all

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: saltwater injection to the Unit 4 spent fuel pool did not begin until March 20th, 2011 due to access problems at the Fukushima facility. Prior to the 20th of March, helicopter water drops and water cannons, both labeled ineffective by NRC officials, were the only means by which TEPCO could attempt to cool the reactors and spent fuel pools. 

435.3 unit 4 boil off time elapsed for possibility

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: cover-page for the next series of screencaptures taken from March 20th, 2011 teleconference calls. 

435.4 cover page

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: mention of ‘signal events’ from Unit 3 and Unit 4. TEPCO’s cover-story was that the March 15th event was a ‘lube oil fire’. NRC officials disputed TEPCO’s contention/evidence about the ‘lube oil fire’ just as they did with TEPCO’s video ‘evidence’ of water in the spent fuel pool of Unit 4.

435.5 unit 4 lube oil fire

435.6 unit 4 lube oil fire

435.7 unit 4 lube oil fire

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: The concern with Unit 4

435.8 integrity of sfp 4

435.9 integrity of sfp 4

436 integrity of sfp 4

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: “…the Japanese, they just grilled us non-stop…”

436.1 unit 4 best pick

436.2 unit 4 best pick

436.3 unit 4 best pick

436.4 unit 4 best pick

436.5 unit 4 best pick

436.6 unit 4 best pick

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: On the Unit 4 spent fuel pool “…they’re at a loss what to do.”

436.7 unit 4 dry unit 3 dry

436.8 unit 4 dry unit 3 dry best

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: John Monninger on Unit 4 “…spent fuel pool…going through the floor…”

436.9 march 20th john monninger on unit 4

437 march 20th john monninger on unit 4 pt 2

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: Brian McDermott on the Unit 4 spent fuel pool “…people are worrying that that stuff has maybe melted through that concrete floor.”

437.1 march 20th brian mcdermott on unit 4

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: Marty Virgilio on Unit 4 spent fuel pool “…I don’t see how there could be possibly water left in there.”

437.2 march 20th virgilio on unit 4

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: Dave Skeen on Unit 4 spent fuel pool “…we’ve never seen any, any kind of steam or vapor coming out of Unit 4.” 

437.3 march 20th never seen steam on uniit 4

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: an email from March 20th, 2011 from Yama-Yamaguchi and a stunning admission “We will be closed  1F-1 to 1F-4 permanently” and “we should have more strong emergency redundant cooling system required for fule pool…”

437.4 march 20th yamaguchi-san fuel pelllets fall out unit 4

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: an email from Brian Sheron, NRC’s Director of the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, in regards to some questions from Congressional staff. It appears as if someone was showing interest as to why the NRC decided the melted fuel rods would not ablate (burn through) through the concrete floor of the spent fuel pool.

438.8 sfp 4 melt on floor no ablation

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: an email from March 21st, 2011 about the Unit 4 spent fuel pool “the one that they’ve had trouble keeping covered”

438.9 march 21st keeping fuel rods covered unit 4

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: cover-page for March 23rd, 2011 teleconference calls…

439 march 23rd on unit 4 cover page

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: March 23rd, 2011 and TEPCO is trying another scheme in an attempt to get closer to the pool with a 50-meter boom truck… 

439.2 march 23rd concrete trucks pump scheme this late in the game

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: NRC officials have problems with TEPCO’s thermal signature…

439.3 march 23rd on bogus thermal scans

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: March 23rd, 2011 water drops on spent fuel pool #4 continue with no change to external dose.

439.4 march 23rd chuck casto on unit 4 water drops

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: NRC Officials discuss the ‘bounding analysis’ that includes 100% of the Unit 4 spent fuel pool.

439.5 march 23rd 100 percent release unit 4

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: March 23rd, 2011…Robert Lewis, Director of NRC’s Office of Preparedness and Response, on a NARAC plume/dose model “It also includes I think a large fraction 100 percent of Unit 4 which we know has already had some release.”

439.6 march 23rd unit 4 has had some release

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: March 23rd, 2011…NRC officials unable to take the Unit 4 spent fuel pool “off the table” as a source term (radioactive emission)

439.7 march 23rd unit 4 still a source term

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: seawater injection to the Unit 4 spent fuel pool from the 24th to 25th of March, 2011 causes “white smoke”.

443.7 march 25 white smoke unit 4

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: an email from March 28th, 2011 calculations show that TEPCO is losing water in a 1 to 22 ratio in the spent fuel pool of Unit 4. Without leak a 44.60 inch increase in water height should have occurred after adding 125 tons of water. TEPCO numbers show a mere 2 inch rise in coolant height after adding 125 tons of water.

443.8 TEPCO numbers don't add up on sfp  unit 4

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: a March 28th, 2011 email evidence that some were questioning an NRC technical opinion that criticality in the Unit 4 spent fuel pool (probably re-criticality at this point if you consider the evidence already put forth in this article) is unlikely based on the presence of “low density racks of borated stainless steel”. Note that the Unit 4 racks were not borated. Also note the reference to 204 fresh fuel assemblies and “fuel damage due to uncovery’.

444 march 28th sfp unit 4 uncovered damaged borated racks

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: the effects of pumping seawater in a reactor or spent fuel pool after a meltdown…hot aqueous chloride would cause stress corrosion cracking of the stainless steel cladding and piping etc.

444.5 25th march CO in ocean saltwater aqueous chloride

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: March 29th, 2011 from an NRC brief…”…no access [to U-4] due to dose rates.” High dose rates=no repairs/countermeasures.

445 march 29 zeolite unit 4 dose rates

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: GE had “first hand observations” based on “eye-witness accounts” from the refueling floor of the Unit 4 spent fuel pool when the earthquake struck.

446.7 march 29th GE calculations on sfp 4 eyewitness

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: March 31st email indicating that a note about the Unit 4 SFP that was in an earlier report is now missing from an updated report…but was the “differing information about water levels” ever resolved?

447 march 31st missing from report unit 4

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: March 31st, 2011…an email that disputes then Chairman Gregory Jaczko’s statement to the ‘Deputies meeting’ that the Unit 4 spent fuel pool was full of water. Jaczko’s statement from the 30th of March, 2011, as indicated in this email, contradicts his own from March 15th, 2011.

447.1 march 31st missing from report unit 4

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: an April 4th, 2011 email discussing the “junk-shot” that will patch “the Leak  at Fukushima”

447.5 junk shot unit 4 sfp

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: an email from April 6th, 2011 in regards to a presentation for the “European Melcore User Group”…one of the key points “…there was a leak from the pool which depleted the water.”

447.7 evidence sfp 4 cracked water drained

448 evidence sfp 4 cracked water drained

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: an April 6th, 2011 email…”Over the last few days, the makeup to the Unit 4 SFP has not been sufficient to offset TEPCO’s calculated losses from steaming.”

449 april 6th sfp 4 water losses not from steaming

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: April 6th, 2011…Unit 4 spent fuel pool cooling is “challenged” and integrity has “failed”.

452 april 6th chart status of alll units and 4 integrity failed complete

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: April 7th, 2011 “ongoing activity” is “not intended to be shared with other stakeholders without Executive Team approval.” Note that as of April 7th, 2011 officials are still considering the sand and lead ‘slurry’ additive to the Unit 4 spent fuel pool as a possibility.

455 goop and slurry

456 goop and slurry

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: April 8th status update of Unit 4.

475 unit 4 status april 8th

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: an April 12th email from Per Peterson from Berkeley.edu that disputes TEPCO’s temperature reading of the Unit 4 spent fuel pool.

476 unit 4 boil off time elapsed for possibility

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: another email from Per Peterson from Berkeley.edu disputing TEPCO’s temperature levels of the unit 4 spent fuel pool and stating that “The evidence is beginning to accumulate that the water level on March 12 was already low…”

481 april 13th sfp 4 sloshing and temp pt 1

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: excellent questions that dispute more of TEPCO’s claims about the Unit 4 spent fuel pool.

482 sfp 4 sloshing and temp pt 2

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: an April 15th email in regards to the TEPCO claim that the spent fuel is undamaged and that “This is a more positive view than yesterday’s statement that damage occurred to some fuel rods.”

489 april 16 sfp 4 analysis flawed

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: April 16th status update of Unit 4.

490 april 16th unit 4 chart

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: a Monday April 18th, 2011 email in regards to TEPCO’s “Roadmap towards Restoration”…note comment number 4.

493 TEPCO roadmap

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: April 22nd status on Unit 4.

495 april 22nd sfp 4 graphic

 (below) From the NRC FOIA documents: April 28th…TEPCO, possibly the world’s worst flip-floppers, now admit publicly that a potential leak in the spent fuel pool of Unit 4 may exist.

500 april 28th TEPCO admits leak redacted

 (below) An excerpt from the Robert Alvarez Study titled “Spent Nuclear Fuel Pools in the U.S.: Reducing the Deadly Risks of Storage”. What you need to know about spent fuel pool fires… 

“In the summer of 2002, the Institute for Policy Studies helped organize a working group including experts

from from academia, the nuclear industry, former government officials, and non-profit research groups

to perform in in-depth study of the vulnerabilities of spent power reactor fuel pools to terrorist attacks. By

January 2003, our study was completed and accepted for publication in the peer-review journal Science and

Global Security We warned that U.S. spent fuel pools were vulnerable to acts of terror. The drainage of a pool might

cause a catastrophic radiation fire, which could render an area uninhabitable much greater than that created by

the Chernobyl accident.

~

In addition to terrorist acts, there are several events could cause a loss of pool water, including leakage,

evaporation, siphoning, pumping, aircraft impact, earthquake, the accidental or deliberate drop of a fuel

transport cask, reactor failure, or an explosion inside or Spent Nuclear Fuel Pools in the U.S.: Reducing the Deadly Effects of Storage

outside the pool building. Industry officials maintain that personnel would have sufficient time to provide an

alternative cooling system before the spent fuel caught fire. But if the water level dropped to just a few feet

above the spent fuel, the radiation doses in the pool building would be lethal — as was demonstrated by

the loss of water in at least two spent fuel pools at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear power station.

The NRC and nuclear industry consultants disputed the paper, which prompted Congress to ask

the National Academy of Sciences to sort out this controversy. In 2004, the Academy reported that U.S. pools

were vulnerable to terrorist attack and to catastrophic fires. According the Academy:

“A loss-of-pool-coolant event resulting from damage or collapse of the pool could have

severe consequences…It is not prudent to dismiss nuclear plants, including spent fuel storage

facilities as undesirable targets for terrorists…under some conditions, a terrorist attack

that partially or completely drained a spent fuel pool could lead to a propagating zirconium

cladding fire and release large quantities of radioactive materials to the environment…Such

fires would create thermal plumes that could potentially transport radioactive aerosols hundreds

of miles downwind under appropriate atmospheric conditions.”

The NRC’s response to this was to attempt to block the release of the Academy’s report.”

(below) From the NRC ‘s NUREG-2157…”the NRC confirmed that the overall risks oassociated with these types of accidents remain low because the spent fuel pool loss-of-coolant event probability is low (NRC 2001)” and “…no new information has emerged that would cause the NRC to question the results of this study.”

700 NRC on sfp fires 2

(below) From the NRC’s NUREG-2157: causes of a spent fuel pool fire…

705 ML13224A106 NRC on sfp fires how they get started

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: Gary Holahan, Deputy Director for the Office of New Reactors , makes a stunning admission in response to President Obama’s directive of the NRC to conduct a comprehensive review the domestic fleet of NPPs : “…we likely will need to re-visit the issue of non-seismically qualified SFPs [in the US]…of which I recall there are many.”

725 non seismically sfp close up

(below) From the NRC FOIA documents: from a March 21st email on Fukushima Unit 4  “…the melt would be retained in the spent fuel pool.”

march 21st complete loss of inventory scenario

march 21st unit 4 melt scenario pt 2

(below) From the NRC’s NUREG-2157: decay times of less than 2 years (fuel rods that have cooled less than 2 years and are still hot) “time-of-release” (time to release radiation) could be less than 10 hours. If the fuel rods have cooled longer than 2 years it could take longer than 10 hours…

NRC on sfp fires 6 time to fire if drained

THE END

Link to the NRC FOIA documents pertaining to Fukushima: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/foia/japan-foia-info.html

Link to NRC FOIA document on Unit 4 and the TEPCO video: http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf

Link to my book “Something Wicked This Way Comes: The story of Plume-Gate, the world’s largest, provable cover-up”

Hatrick Penry wishes to thank Shazzam and MB for their assistance in researching the NRC FOIA documents pertaining to Fukushima without which these works would not be possible~HP

Fukushima Plume-Gate: “Harmless” levels of radiation based on intentionally flawed modeling

“Harmless” levels of radiation in the U.S. were based on short duration source terms (sources of radiation) of 4-5 days. In the NRC FOIA documents pertaining to Fukushima, there is evidence that our government, the NRC, the DOE and others, knew that emanations were ongoing (and still are to this day) 18+ days after the initial catastrophe.

Also to note, there is never any mention of plutonium in any modeling or discussion of it’s effects even though we are told that Unit #3 was a MOX laden reactor. Cesium and Iodine have short half-lives of 30 years and 8.2 years respectively. Plutonium Pu-249 has a half life of 24,000 years.

HatrickPenryUnbound radio broadcast: http://www.blogtalkradio.com/hatrick_penry

Plume-Gate: transpacific model shows conservative estimate 4.5 REM to children in U.S.

Kevin Blanch on YT: http://www.youtube.com/user/kevindblanch

MsMilkytheclown1 on YT: http://www.youtube.com/user/MsMilkytheclown1

Screencaps for Blogtalkradio: something wicked this way comes

Broadcast of 8/9/13 Something wicked this way comes: http://www.blogtalkradio.com/hatrick_penry/2013/08/09/plume-gate-something-wicked-this-way-comes

Screencaptures for this broadcast found in the gallery below:

 

Disappearing Act: How the NRC, EPA and DOE concealed ‘harmless’ levels of radiation detected at U.S. nuclear power plants following the Fukushima disaster

Disappearing Act: How the NRC, EPA and DOE concealed ‘harmless’ levels of radiation detected at U.S. nuclear power plants following the Fukushima disaster

By Hatrick Penry

7/24/13

 invisible man

Another critical aspect to the Plume-Gate cover-up centers on the ‘rooftop grabs’ (radiation measurements) taken from nuclear power plants here in the United States. Officially, we were told by President Obama and authorities that experts did not expect harmful levels of radioactivity to reach the U.S., Hawaii or Alaska. However, inside the NRC FOIA documents pertaining to Fukushima, there is a mountain of evidence that indicates authorities were aware of the severity of the situation (a ‘worst-case-scenario’) but made every effort to downplay and conceal the radioactive plume and fallout from Americans. This includes an effort to conceal radiation measurements in the form of ‘rooftop grabs’ here in the U.S.

7 zirc fire catastrophe

If one examines the NRC FOIA documents pertaining to Fukushima it doesn’t take long to realize that radiation measurements outside the U.S. that were relatively harmless were left untouched by the hand of redaction. The simple fact is the only measurements you can find and read are low-level ones i.e: There are no high-level readings to speak of.  Is this a coincidence?

Now let us examine the ‘rooftop grabs’ from nuclear power plants here in the United States. Again, we are told by authorities that radiation from Fukushima was detected, but levels were well below a safe threshold. We are even allowed to see some low-level measurements that are not redacted. The problem is that, just like samples taken near Fukushima, we are only allowed to see the ones that were relatively insignificant. The only difference is that instead of being redacted, the high level rooftop grabs were forwarded up the chain of command until they reached a password protected database. Why such secrecy over harmless levels of radioactivity? Let’s reexamine the facts:

1)      Authorities insist (to this day) that no harmful levels of radiation have or will reach the U.S. or its territories.

2)      In the NRC FOIA documents we are allowed to see measurements taken that were low-level.

3)      In the NRC FOIA documents there are multiple sections where a discussion leads up to what must be an alarming measurement/sample but then there is heavy redaction and we are not allowed to see the figure.

4)      Authorities insist (to this day) that nuclear power plants in the United States did detect radiation from Fukushima but that levels were harmless.

5)      In the NRC FOIA documents we are allowed to see the measurements from NPPs that were low-level.

6)      All other samples taken from United States nuclear power plants were forwarded up the chain of command into a password protected database accessible only by the ‘Federal Family’.

5 worst case prolonged blackout

If the levels of Fukushima radiation that reached the United States were/are so low, to the degree that they were/are harmless, why are we allowed to see only a handful of the measurements, while the bulk of them are either redacted or secreted into a password protected database? If all the samples and measurements taken were indeed harmless, shouldn’t the public at large have access to them? Why the secrecy? Why not prove that Fukushima fallout is indeed harmless by allowing us to see the redacted and password protected measurements, settling the issue once and for all?

(Authors note: to be clear, there is a difference between the modeling of fallout and the actual sampling and detecting of fallout in the field. Modeling is an assumption, an estimate of the plume and fallout, generated by computers. Sampling and detecting yields actual real time results of radiation levels (with varying degrees of accuracy) at a specific location or locations.)

Please read these other articles pertaining to the dynamics and mechanics of the Plume-Gate cover-up:

Seek and Destroy: NRC Spends Millions to Search for Negative Press

Talking points, Q and As, and press releases: how the NRC keeps the American public in the dark

Liar, Liar: How NRC and other agencies present a united front of deception

Flawed, downplayed or bungled modeling: How the NRC taught me to love the Plume

Now, as always, let’s have a look at some evidence from the NRC FOIA documents:

(below) ‘elevated environmental samples at NMP and Ginna’

10 358 of 360 pager

(below) ‘The Licensee does not believe that the iodine resulted from licensed activities’ (i.e.: the radiation being detected is NOT from nuclear power plants in the U.S.) Note at the bottom they are concerned with who will be collecting this data.

15 357 of 360 pager

(below) Add Palo Verde, SONGS, Diablo Canyon, Columbia and Millstone to the list of U.S. nuclear plants that detected fallout from Fukushima. Note that ‘Industry has agreed to collect the data and provide to NRC for distribution with Federal Government.’

19 NPPs in US detect rads

(below) Particulate grab samples from San Onofre and Palo Verde that we are allowed to see.

20 san onofre detection

(below) U.S. nuclear plants are instructed to alert the NRC if they detect ‘radiological changes’.

25 NPPs detection

(below) March 23rd, 2011 add Kewaunee nuclear plant to the list of U.S. plants that detected Fukushima fallout. Notable quote: ‘Notice on industry data collection similar to what was following the Chernobyl accident in 1986.’

27 march 23 unit 3 control room power on US NPPs detect rads

(below) The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is the focal point for data from U.S. nuclear plants and is developing an online database.

28.5 NEI focal point for rad data plutonium levels

(below) Evidence of a briefing sheet that is approved for circulation inside a nuclear plant.

87 dont share with state

(below) Checking for clearance before forwarding the briefing sheet along to the DOE, EPA and the states. I’ve never seen the DOE or EPA denied modeling or sampling results but I’ve found evidence that U.S. states were.

89 dont share with state

(below) Checking for clearance before sharing sampling data with the DOE, EPA and California (CA).

90 dont share with state

(below) ‘…we recommend that at this time we don’t share with the state.’

95 dont share with state

(below) ‘…environmental data that exceeds the reporting levels first come into the Document Control desk…’

95.5 rooftop grab cover up data top 357 of 360 pager

(below) Evidence of a password protected database for air and standing water samples from U.S. nuclear plants. The public at large does NOT have access to this data.

100 NEI password database for US NPP measurements

(below) Unrelated to the rooftop grabs, this Sandia ‘spent nuclear fuel fire’ study from 2007 is encrypted and requires a password to open and read. Why is this information not accessible to the American public? 

110 sandia 2007 spent fuel fire study password encrypted